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Functional Neuroimaging: Technical, Logical, and Social Perspectives 
Abstract 
Neuroscientists have long sought to study the dynamic activity of the human brain—what's happening in 
the brain, that is, while people are thinking, feeling, and acting. Ideally, an inside look at brain function 
would simultaneously and continuously measure the biochemical state of every cell in the central nervous 
system. While such a miraculous method is science fiction, a century of progress in neuroimaging 
technologies has made such simultaneous and continuous measurement a plausible fiction. Despite this 
progress, practitioners of modern neuroimaging struggle with two kinds of limitations: those that attend 
the particular neuroimaging methods we have today and those that would limit any method of imaging 
neural activity, no matter how powerful. 
In this essay, I consider the liabilities and potential of techniques that measure human brain activity. I am 
concerned here only with methods that measure relevant physiologic states of the central nervous 
system and relate those measures to particular mental states. I will consider in particular the preeminent 
method of functional neuroimaging: BOLD fMRI. While there are several practical limits on the biological 
information that current technologies can measure, these limits—as important as they are—are minor in 
comparison to the fundamental logical restraints on the conclusions that can be drawn from brain 
imaging studies. 
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Functional	neuroimaging:	
Technical,	Logical,	and	Social	perspectives	
Geoffrey K Aguirre
Neuroscientists have long sought to study the dynamic activity of the human brain while 
people think, feel, and act. Ideally, an inside look at brain function would simultaneously 
and continuously measure the biochemical state of every cell in the central nervous 
system. While such a miraculous method is science fiction, a century of progress in 
neuroimaging technologies has made it a plausible fiction. 
Non-invasive measures of neural function have been available since the 1920s, when 
electroencephalography (EEG) was developed to measure at the scalp the electrical 
signals of brain activity. Other techniques, such as positron emission tomography (PET) 
and single photon emission computed tomography (SPECT), followed in the 1980s and 
improved upon the crude spatial resolution of EEG. A major subsequent advance 
occurred in the 1990s, with the advent of blood oxygen level dependent (BOLD) 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). This last technique has ushered in the 
modern revolution of neuroimaging, as it provides non-invasive, rapid, high-resolution 
images of the brain in action, and in the past two decades in particular, these 
technologies have become both more precise and much more widely used. Despite this 
progress, practitioners of modern neuroimaging struggle with two limitations: those that 
attend the particular neuroimaging methods we have today, and those that would limit 
even the imaginary technique of omniscient imaging.
I consider in this paper the liabilities and potential of techniques that measure human 
brain activity. There are many interventional procedures that examine the relationship 
between brain and behavior, but I am concerned here only with methods that measure 
relevant physiologic states of the central nervous system and relate those measures to 
particular mental states. I will consider in particular the preeminent method of functional 
neuroimaging: BOLD fMRI. While there are several practical limits on the biological 
information that current technologies can measure, these limits—as important as they 
are—are minor in comparison with the fundamental, logical restraints upon the 
conclusions that can be drawn from brain imaging studies. Below, I consider how these 
logical limitations differ for the different types of questions that might be asked using 
neuroimaging.
The limits of neuroimaging technologies are well understood within the scientific areas 
in which neuroimaging is a mature technique. During its rapid growth, however, 
neuroimaging has made multiple lateral moves to new areas of intellectual investigation. 
A feature of this “imaging colonization” is that the method has moved more quickly than 
the hard-won cautionary experience. The ubiquity and availability of the hardware and 
software to collect data and produce brain images has contributed to a tendency for the 
initial neuroimaging work in new fields to lack the methodological rigor present in more 
established areas. 
Despite many cautions and limitations, I will close this paper by recognizing the 
astonishing power of neuroimaging techniques. Contrary to the claims of some critics, 
neuroimaging is not simply a modern phrenology. As the field embraces new, powerful 
analytic techniques, there has been a shift from explanation to prediction. This transition 
brings neuroimaging to the brink of science fiction, providing a method to access the 
private mental states and traits of individuals who choose to cooperate with a brain 
scan.
What do Neuroimaging Technologies Measure?
The bio-electrical basis of human brain function has been studied since the early 1800s, 
although initially with undesirable invasiveness to circumvent the electrical insulation of 
the skull. The modern era of non-invasive measurement of human brain activity began 
in the 1920s with Hans Berger’s development of the electroencephalograph. There has 
been a profusion of neuroimaging methods since, spawning an alphabet soup of neuro-
initialisms: e.g. SPECT, PET, MEG, EEG, BOLD fMRI, ASL, and NIRS (see glossary 
and annotated bibliography at the end). 
Despite this daunting variety, the non-invasive measurement of human brain activity 
may be divided into several broad techniques: (a) those that directly measure the 
electro-magnetic fields produced by active neurons, and (b) those that measure the 
metabolic activity of neurons, and those ( c) that measure the local changes in blood 
flow that are produced by brain activity.
(a) Directly measuring electrical activity in the brain
The fundamental means of information transfer in the nervous system is the 
movement of charged particles (ions) across the cell membranes of neurons. This 
movement produces an electrical current and changes the electrical potential 
(voltage) of the cells. Measurement of these voltage changes is the basis of EEG 
and ERP, while MEG measures disturbance of the local magnetic field produced by 
the neural current. These kinds of neuroimaging studies are often referred to as 
“electrophysiologic” techniques.
(b) Measuring neural metabolism
Neurons consume glucose (a simple sugar) and oxygen to fuel their biological 
activity. Two neuroimaging technologies that measure this metabolic function are 
PET and SPECT. These are nuclear medicine techniques in which a radio-labeled 
compound is injected into the bloodstream (or in some approaches, inhaled) and 
then travels to the brain. In one application, glucose molecules are modified to carry 
a radioactive isotope of carbon. The modified glucose is taken up by nerve cells and 
when the carbon atom undergoes radioactive decay, energetic particles are emitted 
that are recorded by a detector around the subject’s head. The amount and location 
of this radioactivity pinpoints areas of increased glucose consumption and thus 
neural activity. Depending upon the compound to which the radioactive isotope is 
attached, these techniques can measure different metabolic and physiologic aspects 
of neural function.
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(c) Measuring neuro-vascular changes
A fortuitous property of brain physiology is that local changes in neural activity give 
rise to local changes in blood flow and blood oxygenation. This “neuro-vascular” 
coupling is sensible from a teleological perspective. Increases in the computational 
activities of neurons requires an increased supply of oxygen and glucose fuel, and 
an increased need to clear away the byproducts of metabolism. Correspondingly, 
when neurons increase their activity, local blood vessels increase in size, allowing 
more blood to flow to the active area. Brain activity and blood flow is tightly coupled 
on a spatial scale, with an increase in blood flow localized to only 3-5mm around an 
active point in the brain. More oxygen is delivered to active parts of the brain than is 
actually consumed by the neurons. Therefore, there is a paradoxical increase in the 
concentration of oxygen in brain areas with increase activity.
Measurement of this local increase in tissue oxygenation that follows neural activity 
is the fundamental basis of the preeminent neuroimaging technique: Blood Oxygen 
Level Dependent (BOLD) functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI). The 
manner by which an MRI scanner ultimately measures this proxy of neural activity is 
the consequence of a chain of associations in physics and physiology.
Hemoglobin is the primary oxygen carrying molecule in the blood. At its center, each 
hemoglobin molecule contains an iron atom. Iron, in turn, has slightly different 
magnetic properties depending upon whether the hemoglobin is currently carrying 
oxygen or is not. An MRI scanner (which is itself a very strong magnet) can be made 
sensitive to this tiny difference in the magnetic property of blood when it has more or 
less oxygen present.
In sum, an increase in the activity of neurons at a point in the brain increases blood 
flow to that area. This increased blood flow brings in more fresh oxygen, which alters 
the magnetic properties of the iron atoms in hemoglobin molecules. The scanner, 
then, measures this alteration of magnetic strength. This chain of associations is 
what allows fMRI to make indirect measurements of neural activity.
These different kinds of neuroimaging techniques make different sacrifices in spatial 
and temporal resolution. The electrically-based measures provide high temporal 
resolution, with the ability to examine the evolution of neural activity across the brain on 
a millisecond basis. However, the distortion of electrical and magnetic fields produced 
by the skull and scalp leave these techniques with coarse spatial resolution. In contrast, 
the metabolic and neuro-vascular techniques, such as BOLD fMRI and PET, have better 
spatial resolution, but relatively poor temporal resolution as changes in these metabolic 
measures lag behind the changes in brain activity.
A catalog of additional caveats and idiosyncracies accompany all of these neuroimaging 
technique. And while particular situations might favor one technique over another, BOLD 
fMRI has become the preeminent method of non-invasive measurement of brain activity 
because in many cases it provides a desirable balance between temporal and spatial 
resolution. Additionally, fMRI scanning does not expose the subject to ionizing radiation, 
obtains data from the entire brain, and provides a signal that is strong in relation to 
sources of noise.
Because of the near-ubiquity of fMRI, I will focus upon this neuroimaging tool, and next 
consider how the data collected by the scanner is refined and processed to produce the 
colorful brain images that now decorate so many scientific articles and lay-press reports 
of neuroscience.
BOLD fMRI: From Raw Data to Colorful Images
BOLD fMRI scanners break the brain down into tens of thousands of tiny cubes called 
“voxels,” which are the fundamental unit of measurement for fMRI studies. Voxels are 
usually between 0.5-3 mm per side and they contain tens to hundreds of thousands of 
neurons. The scanner makes measurements of activity over the entire brain every 1-3 
seconds, with a typical study requiring about an hour to complete for one person.
Images created from this raw data look quite different from the sharp pictures of brain 
activity usually associated with a clinical MRI scan. Figure 1a shows a single, horizontal 
slice through the brain at one point in time. A scan of the entire brain is composed of a 
stack of these 2-dimensional slices, and the entire data set is a series of these slices 
over time. In this image, which is coarse and fuzzy, the darker and lighter shades 
correspond to the relative magnetic effects of oxygenated blood across the brain. With 
increases in neural activity, the image becomes lighted at a given point as oxygen 
content increases with increased blood flow.
The data from a neuroimaging experiment are often analyzed by considering the profile 
of signal over time from each point in the brain. Figure 1b shows the time-series 
response for a single voxel in a hypothetical experiment. You can see that the signal 
from this particular voxel goes up when the fearful face is shown and down when the 
neutral face is shown, indicating that seeing a face with emotional content creates a 
demand for oxygen in that voxel, presumably because the neurons in that voxel become 
more active when the subject is looking at fearful faces. You may also notice that the 
response is a little delayed and that it lasts for a while (it isn’t a quick spike). Indeed an 
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important feature of the fMRI signal is that it is both delayed and dispersed with respect 
to the stimuli (and, presumably, neural events) that evoked the response—the person in 
the scanner sees the fearful face and experiences an immediate and short-lived 
response to it, but the scanner detects a slightly delayed response that stretches out 
over several seconds. This is because fMRI measures the physiologic, hemodynamic 
events (changes in the amount of oxygen in cells) that are the downstream product of 
neural activity and not the neural activity itself.
Another way of stating this point is to say that the spatial and temporal resolution of 
fMRI is limited by the neuro-vascular coupling that is the source of contrast (it is limited 
by the nature of what is being measured). While MRI images can be obtained as rapidly 
as every 100 milliseconds, and with spatial resolution in the tenths of a millimeter, this 
fine resolution has little practical advantage for fMRI. Changes in neural activity, which 
are often very quick and can be very localized, give rise to a change in blood flow and 
oxygenation (and thus a change in the fMRI signal) that evolves over seconds and that 
spreads over several millimeters, making it impossible to identify precisely which 
neurons were active. As a result of these inherent limits, fMRI images are seldom 
acquired more frequently than once a second and are typically composed of voxels no 
smaller than 1 mm per side. 
Ideally, fMRI data would be acquired from motionless brains of uniform shape. 
Unfortunately, this is not the case, and a number of processing steps are performed on 
the data to correct for what researchers call “imaging artifacts.” The need for some of 
these steps is easily understood. For example, there is inevitably some degree of 
movement of the head during scanning, which can be corrected in a manner similar to 
“image stabilization” technology in video cameras. Similarly, because the beating of the 
heart and the respiratory cycle can affect the fMRI signal, the cardio-pulmonary cycle is 
measured during scanning and its physiologic artifacts are removed. Other processing 
steps are more esoteric consequences of the properties of fMRI imaging, but are no 
less essential to conduct.
Even after correcting for motion and other artifacts, it is usually the case that the fMRI 
signal that is produced by changes in neural activity is small compared with the random 
variation present in the data. This random variation in brain activity is not a result of 
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exposure to the stimuli (in this example, face pictures). Instead, there is always activity 
in the brain, even when we sleep. Statistical tests are required to distinguish between 
the changes in brain signal that result from the experiment, and those random 
fluctuations which would have been present regardless. In most cases the time-series 
data from each voxel are compared with a predicted response, and the statistical 
reliability of this effect is measured. Figure 2, for example, illustrates how a t-statistic (a 
measure of statistical likelihood) can be calculated by examining the amount of variation 
in one voxel’s time-series data that can be explained by switching between the two 
different faces. This calculation yields a statistical value for the time-series data for one 
voxel—a probability that the change corresponds to the manipulation of interest. To 
simplify the display of these results, it is common practice to color-code the voxel from 
which the time-series was taken. Often, a red-to-yellow scale is used to indicate the 
strength of the statistical association.
This calculation can be conducted in a similar manner for every voxel in the brain, 
yielding a map of the statistical effect of the experiment at each point in the brain over 
time. This statistical map is the final result of many neuroimaging studies.
There are a few additional steps, however, that lie between the calculation of a 
statistical map and the display of the result in a scientific publication (Figure 3). The 
statistical map has a value for every point in the brain. Because there are so many 
voxels in a typical neuroimaging study (on the order of 100,000), it is overwhelmingly 
likely that random fluctuation in the fMRI signal will just happen to produce large 
statistical values in some voxels, even if the experiment had no actual effect on those 
voxels. Therefore, it is common practice to adopt a threshold that corrects for the 
number of voxels studied, and only accept statistical values that are unlikely to have 
occurred by chance (Figure 3). Data below this threshold are discarded, leaving a 
“cleaner” image representing only changes in blood oxygenation that are likely to have 
resulted from the experimental stimulus.
Next, it is common practice to digitally “smooth” fMRI data, blurring the measurement 
from one point in the brain with adjacent points. This may initially seem like an 
undesirable thing to do, as the blurring reduces the precision with which a brain activity 
change can be assigned to a particular point in the brain and makes it likely that very 
small areas of activity will be blurred to the point of being no longer visible. These 
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limitations, however, are balanced by improvements in statistical power (by reducing the 
number of independent statistical tests that need to be performed in the smoother data). 
Additionally, when analyzing data across different people, spatial smoothing helps to 
overcome residual differences in anatomy between subjects that might otherwise render 
common areas of activation non-overlapping (i.e. smoothing helps reveal what is in 
common in brain response across individuals).
A third step is to lay the data on top of a high-resolution, anatomical image. As we have 
seen, the raw functional fMRI data are coarse, making it difficult to discern the location 
of specific brain structures. For this reason, the smoothed and thresholded statistical 
maps are usually displayed atop high-resolution, anatomical images of brain structure 
that are acquired during the same session as the functional activation data. This step 
simplifies the localization of sites of neuroimaging response to brain anatomy.
Finally, the combined functional and anatomical volume must be displayed. Because the 
result is three-dimensional, some display options are cumbersome. For example, some 
neuroimaging studies display the results as a series of 2-dimensional slices through the 
data, starting (for example) at the bottom of the brain and moving up, slice-by-slice. An 
alternative, and increasingly popular, display approach is to produce a three-
dimensional, digital rendering of the cortical surface and then display the color-coded, 
above-threshold statistical results upon it. In some applications, the cortical surface is 
digitally separated from the underlying brain structure, and flattened into a sheet, 
allowing the areas of statistical response from within the curves and folds of the brain to 
be seen easily.
Each of these display steps is designed to facilitate the communication of results while 
still accurately reporting the data. It is important to realize, however, how far we have 
travelled from the initial, fuzzy functional activation data (Figure 1a) to the final, polished 
result (Figure 3, right). While these steps are well justified from a scientific standpoint, in 
aggregate they have come to constitute an aesthetic; there is a certain way that 
neuroimaging results are “expected” to look.  I will consider the consequences of these 
aesthetic choices below.
Practical Limits of fMRI 
While there has been remarkable progress over the past century, there remain 
considerable limits on the quantity and quality of information that may be derived from 
neuroimaging techniques in general and from fMRI in particular. 
Many of these limits relate to the possibility that the imaging method may fail to 
measure a relevant aspect of nervous system function. While we have considered so far 
“brain activity” in aggregate, there is actually a diverse array of cell types in the brai 
(neurons and supporting glial cells) all communicating with a variety of 
neurotransmitters and stimulating different types of receptors. Beyond the on-going 
electrical activity of neurons, brain function includes activity driven changes in DNA 
transcription, regulation of the expression of channels in the cell membrane, synaptic 
pruning, and even the modulation of neurogenesis in some areas of cortex. Functional 
MRI reduces this symphony of biological function to a single note of neural “activity”. 
The fMRI signal is driven primarily by the release of neuro-transmitter at the connection 
points between neurons, which (under most physiologic circumstances) is proportional 
to the electrical activity of neurons. The measure does not indicate which 
neurotransmitter was released, if it had an excitatory or an inhibitory effect upon the 
receiving neuron, or even if the activity is within a local network of neurons or the result 
of activity from distant cell bodies. The practical consequence of this jargon-laden 
summary is that the same fMRI signal may be obtained for a diverse set of underlying 
brain cell operations. We do not know what “more” of the imaging signal means in terms 
of neural function. Also, the fMRI signal is likely insensitive to many critical aspects of 
neural computation—it just cannot detect all relevant neural changes in response to a 
mental state of interest.
Further, the imaging signal is integrated over several seconds of time and several 
hundreds of thousands of neurons. Consequently, some neural activity cannot be 
detected using fMRI. For example, a neural signal that rises and falls every second 
would appear as an unchanging, average signal with fMRI; the blood vessels simply 
cannot change rapidly enough to keep up with that speed of alternation of neural 
activity. Similarly, two different mental states might have identical aggregate levels of 
BOLD signal in a particular brain region, but differ critically in how this activity is 
distributed over a population of neurons. Functional MRI may not pick up these 
differences.
There are additional limitations that follow from generalizing neuroimaging results from 
individuals to populations. Different people have different shaped brains. These 
differences cannot be resolved through simple scaling, and they extend to the complex 
pattern of gyral and sulcal folds that comprise the cortical surface. While there have 
been enormous advances in computational techniques to match brain anatomy between 
individuals, irreducible differences between people in the mapping of structure-to-
function provide one boundary on the translation of group results to individuals. In 
addition, different people have different lifestyles and medication regimens, which can 
alter the fMRI signal in surprising ways. The technique relies critically upon the steady 
response of blood flow to changes in neuron activity. Medical states and drug effects 
can alter this neuro-vascular coupling, confounding measurements of brain activity. For 
example, drinking coffee before a fMRI scan can markedly increase the signal, while 
taking an ibuprofen can abolish it. 
Finally, a perhaps welcome limitation of brain imaging technology is the requirement for 
a cooperative subject. The measurement of subtle aspects of neural response often 
requires an hour or more of data collection, during which the subject must hold still and 
attend to the instructions and stimuli presented. Those who conduct neuroimaging 
studies in children, patient populations, the elderly, or almost any group beside eager 
college students, quickly discover how difficult it is to obtain these data even from willing 
participants. It would be trivially easy for a coerced subject to deny a neuroimager 
useful data through any one of several countermeasures, ranging from averting one’s 
eyes from presented to stimuli, to making small head movements, to actively directing 
one’s thoughts to other subjects. And for those who would fear clandestine 
neuroimaging, cataloging our mental states and traits without our knowledge, it is 
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reassuring to observe that there is nothing subtle about a 35-ton machine that clangs at 
100 decibels while in operation.
It should be noted that each of these practical barriers, and many more not considered 
here, are the target of a sustained research assault. Already, clever experimental design 
can provide access to some neural information below the ostensible temporal and 
spatial resolution of the technique. Advances in between-person brain alignment, based 
upon the pattern of cortical surface topology, appear able to overcome much of the 
anatomical difference between individuals, providing surprisingly good registration of 
functional mapping across individuals. Subject cooperation has also become less critical 
with the advent of “resting-state” neuroimaging methods. In these studies, discussed in 
greater detail below, the pattern of correlated activity across brain regions is obtained 
while subjects daydream without explicit instructions or stimuli. The observed patterns 
have been found to correlate with subject traits and states, and to support classification 
of individuals into diagnostic categories. Further, incremental improvement of 
neuroimaging approaches will wear down these limits, and bring the technology ever 
closer to the theoretical limit of what might be learned.
Theoretical Limits of Neuroscientific Inference
There is diversity not only in neuroimaging methods, but in the kinds of studies in which 
these techniques are used. Despite the variety, we can break these studies into two 
overarching types. The first falls in the domain of neuroscience and asks “why” and 
“how” questions about the relationship between brain and behavior. These studies 
examine the “neural basis” of a particular emotional or mental state, and seek to 
understand complex cognitive operations by looking at more elemental neural and 
psychological units. The second, broad category of study adopts an a-theoretical 
stance, and asks whether a particular neuroimaging finding can predict (with some 
accuracy) behavior now or in the future. We consider first these neuroscientific 
applications of brain imaging that seek to understand the neural mechanisms that link 
brain function and mental states.
These neuroscience applications of brain imaging generally pose questions about the 
relationship of the brain and behavior in one of two “directions: Forward or reverse 
inference. Forward inference studies examine the anatomical, neural correlates of a 
given mental operation, and are often used to investigate localization questions; that is, 
to work out which areas of the brain are active during a particular experimental 
condition. Generally, the subject is presented with instructions and stimuli designed to 
selectively evoke a particular mental or emotional state of interest, and the 
neuroimaging method identifies if and where changes in neural activity accompany that 
cognitive process. 
For example, does perception of a human face activate a particular area of the brain 
different from that evoked by perception of other stimuli? The key assumption for this 
type of study design is that a given cognitive process exists and that the task isolates 
only that cognitive process. Various manipulations of stimuli and instructions are used in 
an attempt to isolate the mental operation of interest from the other processes that 
invariably are present (e.g., neural process required to push a button or prepare a 
response or understand what the instructor is saying, etc.). Often, an "experimental" 
condition is contrasted with a "control" condition that is designed to evoke all of the 
cognitive processes present in the experimental period except the cognitive process of 
interest. This approach is sometimes referred to as “cognitive subtraction”, as the aim is 
to “subtract” away the undesired mental states, leaving behind the mental state to be 
studied. This assumption that a mental state or cognitive operation can be purely 
isolated through a behavioral manipulation lies at the heart of every forward inference 
study, and is a key inferential weakness. Even the cooperative subject might, for 
example, engage other, confounding, mental operations unintentionally, rendering this 
assumption invalid.
Neuroscience studies also examine the relationship between brain and behavior in the 
“reverse” direction. Reverse inference studies leverage knowledge about the neural 
correlates of particular mental states to learn something about an imperfectly 
understood behavior. One begins by assuming that neural activity in a particular area of 
the brain is a marker of the presence of a particular mental state and no other. For 
example, neural activity of a certain magnitude at a certain spot in the fusiform gyrus 
may be assumed to indicate that the subject is in the behavioral state of seeing a 
human face. The subject then performs a task which may or may not evoke the 
cognitive process of interest. For example, ambiguous stimuli are presented that may 
be perceived as a face or a vase. If the specified neural activity is seen, the conclusion 
is drawn that the subject saw a face at that moment in time. Reverse inference studies 
have been the basis of the rapidly growing fields of emotional, social, and economic 
neuroscience, in which activity in certain brain locations is taken as evidence of a 
particular emotional or cognitive state. 
What provides the evidence that a particular region of the brain is uniquely activated by 
a specific cognitive process? Logically, only an exhaustive, enumerative induction in 
which neuroimaging is used to examine every possible cognitive process, under every 
possible circumstance. This is obviously practically impossible, so a series of 
neuroimaging experiments that demonstrate activation of a particular region during a 
given cognitive process and no other usually suffices to support the assumption. 
Naturally, neuroimaging studies differ in the quality of the evidence to support the 
reverse inference. In some cases, it may be readily shown that different mental 
operations are, in fact, capable of activating the same brain region—that is, that the 
reverse inference study is invalid.
From neuroscientific cause to behavioral prediction
I have considered neuroimaging studies that seek to understand cause, specifically how 
does neural activity cause behavior (or, what is going on in the brain when a person 
behaves one way verses another?). This worthy enterprise faces the inferential 
challenges common to any scientific endeavor that seeks a mechanistic or causal 
between the phenomena being studied. Namely, imperfect control over the thing the 
experiment manipulates (in this case, behavior and mental states) leads to uncertainty 
when concluding how the manipulation relates to the measurement.
There is, however, another type of neuroimaging study that asks rather different 
questions, and consequently avoids these inferential limitations. In this approach the 
goal is not to understand how or why behavior and brain states are related, but simply 
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to provide accurate predictions about behavior from brain state measurements. 
Eschewing a neuroscientific account of how, this prediction approach asks only if a 
given pattern of brain imaging data predicts a given behavior now or in the future. As an 
illustration, consider the inferential differences between the following claims that might 
be made of a neuroimaging study:
(a) Activity in the nucleus accumbens (a part of the brain associated with “reward” 
signals) is increased when a person addicted to cocaine views pictures of drug 
paraphernalia. Therefore, drug addicted people experience a sense of craving 
when viewing pictures of drug paraphernalia.
(b) The amount of activity in the nucleus accumbens in response to pictures of drug 
paraphernalia predicts the likelihood that someone will have a positive urine test 
for cocaine in the week following the brain imaging study.
The first claim concludes that a particular mental state has been evoked in people by 
viewing activity within their brain. This conclusion is dependent upon knowing that 
activity in the brain region (the nucleus accumbens) is uniquely associated with a sense 
of craving. This is a fundamentally difficult assumption to support. While the study might 
be able to convincingly claim that there is a difference in brain response to the pictures 
between people who use drugs and those who don’t, attributing those differences to a 
particular mental state (craving) is challenging. Indeed, the claim that the brain activity 
difference between the groups is due to being drug addicted per se is challenging. 
Perhaps (for example) drug users are more alert, and simply pay closer attention to the 
pictures in the experiment, resulting in a larger brain response for this group compared 
to the non-addicted control subjects.
In contrast, the second claim concerns matters that are more easily measured and 
verified. The study has confirmed a prediction: if there is a large brain response to the 
pictures shown to the subject, they are more likely to use cocaine in the following week. 
Apart from challenging the accuracy of the urine testing, the conclusion is fairly 
unassailable.
Importantly, this second kind of claim makes no mention of mental states or mechanism. 
The predictive accuracy of responses from this point in the brain for drug use could be 
because this brain region is related to craving. But the prediction could also succeed if 
the increased activity in the drug addicted is from some other mental state, or even from 
some confounding medical or physiologic state that just happens itself to predict drug 
use. The shift in stance from providing an account of the mechanisms of cognition to 
simply trying to make accurate predictions of behavior frees the study from many 
inferential shackles.
Almost any neuroimaging study, with a variety of experimental designs and data 
analysis approaches, may be used in the service of either of these two types of 
inferential claim. In the last decade, however, two particular neuroimaging approaches 
have become increasingly associated with the second, predictive application of 
neuroimaging, indicating a shift among some researchers from studying cause, to 
predicting an effect.
MVPA and Resting State studies
Multi-voxel pattern analysis (MVPA) is the name given to neuroimaging studies that 
generally avoid localizing mental operations, but instead consider the distributed and 
complex pattern of neural response that stimuli or experimental conditions might evoke 
across the entire brain. Typically, there is an initial “training” phase, during which the 
distributed neural response to a set of stimuli or conditions is measured. The goal is to 
repeatedly evoke a particular mental state or behavior in the participant under a variety 
of circumstances. The commonalities in brain response across these presentations are 
identified by computer software (generally, “machine learning algorithms”). At the end of 
the training phase, the computer has identified that a particular pattern of brain 
response is evoked by a particular stimulus or behavior.
Next, there is a “test” phase, during which the subject is shown other stimuli or asked to 
engage in certain behaviors and the software attempts to classify the evoked brain 
states according to the patterns learned during the training phase. In effect, can the 
pattern of brain activity the subject currently has be matched to one of the patterns 
learned during the training phase? In this manner, MVPA studies have been used to 
“read out” from the pattern of brain activity (for example) which one of many pictures a 
person is currently viewing, or whether the subject is currently mentally adding or 
subtracting a pair of numbers.
The information used for the training and testing phases of these studies can be of 
different kinds, and in principle can be conducted within or across subjects. For 
example, a computer classifier can learn the consistent pattern of brain activity evoked 
by different uncomfortable stimuli (e.g., a hot wire on the skin or a sharp pin), and then 
in the test phase be used to predict the subjective pain report a given person will 
provide to some novel painful stimulus. As another example, people who smoke could 
undergo brain scanning while they watch different videos of smoking cessation 
advertisements. The machine learning algorithm would then be trained to associate a 
particular pattern of brain response to the chance that the person will have quit 
cigarettes a month later. In the test phase, the experiment might ask if the pattern of 
brain activity observed in response to new advertisements can predict the effectiveness 
of their use in a smoking cessation campaign.
The key challenge that these predictive studies face is demonstrating that the ability of 
the brain measurement to predict behavior can extend beyond the particular type of 
stimuli or experimental states studied. For example, can the measurement of subjective 
sensation of pain generalize to other types of painful stimuli? Chronic pain? Emotional 
pain? A strength of prediction studies, however, is that these questions may be 
addressed in a fairly direct empirical manner, without overt concern for the 
neuroscientific basis of the success or failure of the generalization. Indeed, if one cares 
only about making accurate predictions, the details of what aspects of brain function are 
providing the predictive information are irrelevant. If a brain scan can predict with high 
accuracy which smoking cessation videos will effectively modify behavior, it in some 
sense doesn’t matter what aspect of neural activity enables this prediction. Yet in 
practice, there is a rich and necessary interplay between the neuroscientific and 
predictive stances. For example, the prediction software can become more effective 
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when it is designed using knowledge of the principles of neural response and 
representation in different brain regions. Moreover, the details of how the software maps 
brain states to behavioral states can serve as the basis for deep neuroscientific insights, 
perhaps explored in subsequent, “hypothesis driven” studies.
In addition to MVPA studies, another kind of neuroimaging approach is also well suited 
to predictive inferences. “Resting state connectivity” studies collect data from different 
brain regions while the subject is in a putative “rest” state in the scanner, and not 
exposed to stimuli or instructions. Data showing the patterns of resting state signals 
across the brain allow researchers to divide the brain into different, functionally 
connected regions. These connectivity maps may then be compared across populations 
(clinical or otherwise) and between different behavioral states. A frequent initial critique 
of these studies is to challenge the very notion that there is a “rest” state, and that it 
would look the same in different people or groups. Rather than a limitation of this 
approach, however, this fact is actually the entire point. When given no explicit 
instructions regarding how to manipulate their internal mental operations, people 
engage in spontaneous mental activity that is revealing about their behavioral state or 
predictive of their behavioral traits. As with an MVPA studies, a radical inferential stance 
adopts an agnostic view towards the meaning of particular neural patterns in such 
studies, and is content to assert that given neural patterns predict with a specified 
accuracy certain behaviors or group memberships. As with MVPA, the actual conduct of 
this line of scientific inquiry is more often nuanced, relying on an interplay between 
prediction and neuroscientific hypothesis testing.
Neuroimaging and the sociology of science
The ability to obtain non-invasive recordings of human brain activity has a nearly 100 
year history, and the 20th anniversary of the development of functional MRI has recently 
passed. During this time, enormous effort has been expended to refine, validate, and 
expand the analytical and inferential tools of neuroimaging. It is now possible to conduct 
an fMRI study with great confidence in the statistical validity of the results and with 
clear-eyed understanding of the assumptions upon which any claims are based. Despite 
this, critics of neuroimaging can point accurately to many studies that make breathless
—and arguably baseless—claims regarding the brain and behavior. What factors might 
contribute to the discrepancy between the available rigor and promise of neuroimaging 
techniques and the proliferation of studies of questionable quality? Further, why is it that 
neuroimaging studies seem to have such an outsize influence upon scientific 
discourse? 
I believe that the marked variability of research quality in neuroimaging may be 
attributed to the manner in which neuroimaging techniques have spread within and 
between academic disciplines. Before the advent of fMRI, PET scanning was the 
primary means of obtaining images of brain activity. PET scanners are specialized 
medical devices, requiring a cyclotron and the injection of radioisotopes, which greatly 
limited the availability of the technology. The development of fMRI, however, radically 
altered this situation. MRI scanners are nearly ubiquitous in modern hospitals, and while 
some equipment upgrades improve the quality of the data, even a standard, clinical MRI 
machine may be used for neuroimaging studies. This produced a rapid and 
revolutionary democratization of neuroimaging research.
The easy collection of data, however, raised the challenge: How would it be analyzed? 
Functional MRI data sets are large and, as described above, must be subjected to fairly 
involved pre-processing and statistical analyses to account for the many idiosyncratic 
properties of the data in space and time. The quantitative and statistical knowledge 
necessary to analyze this data is quite specialized, and requires in addition some skill 
with computer programming. While it might be easy to place a subject in the scanner 
and collect a gigabyte of neuroimaging data, the challenge of how to produce a result in 
the form of a brain image remains.
As it happens, the ubiquity of MRI scanners intersected with the availability of free, 
open-source software capable of performing these analyses. Statistical Parametric 
Mapping (SPM) software, made freely available by the FIL (Functional Imaging 
Laboratory of Wellcome Trust Center), provided for push-button analysis of 
neuroimaging data. This software placed complicated data analysis and statistical 
methods behind an easy to use graphical interface. This removed a barrier to new users 
of neuroimaging methods. Indeed, the democratization of scanner and software was 
perfectly timed with the rapid rise of the internet in the early 1990s, making the software 
available for remote download.
Consequently, little more than research access to a hospital and an internet connection 
was needed to perform neuroimaging experiments and produce pictures of the brain in 
operation. Inevitably, despite the best intentions and most strenuous of educational 
efforts on the part of the authors of SPM, investigators were empowered to analyze 
fMRI data with minimal understanding of the many statistical processes and 
assumptions which lay behind the software buttons and the brain images that they 
ultimately produced. A playful analogy to this circumstance considers the difference 
between long and arduous martial arts training that produces both power and 
responsibility, and the provision of a gun.
The ready availability of neuroimaging hardware and software has meant that the 
technique can be readily adopted in new areas of intellectual inquiry, without having to 
bring along the hard-won cautionary experience that result from years of training and 
experience. While best practices may be understood in areas of inquiry for which 
neuroimaging is a mature technique, this is often not the case in the first, exciting rush 
of novel work in a new field. Essentially, the phylogeny of the evolution of neuroimaging 
technique is recapitulated anew each time fMRI seeds new ground.
This history partially accounts for the steady production of papers that aim to illuminate 
and correct statistical errors that appear in the neuroimaging literature. Recent, high-
profile publications have cautioned investigators to appropriately correct for multiple 
statistical comparisons across the brain volume, to avoid performing statistical tests 
upon data subsets that were themselves selected by that statistical test, and to test for 
statistical interactions when interaction results are claimed. Each of these statistical 
errors are well understood outside of (and within subsets of) neuroimaging research, but 
must be reinforced anew. A deeper and more worrisome issue is that many choices are 
available regarding the analysis parameters of neuroimaging data (e.g., how much to 
smooth, which regions of the brain to examine, whether to remove certain effects of no 
interest). Many degrees of freedom are therefore available to the investigator to explore 
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the data in search of a desired result, and to offer that result as if it were the inevitable 
consequence of a pre-determined analysis pathway. This is not a statistical error that is 
by any means unique to neuroimaging data, but it is one that is magnified by the ease 
with which the dials of the analysis may be turned on a computer screen.
The power of the brain images themselves must also be acknowledged. As I discussed 
earlier, the transition from the raw, functional imaging data to the final, published brain 
image involves many individual processing steps, each of which can be well justified in 
scientific terms. In aggregate, however, these steps serve to produce brain images that 
have a distinctive “organic” aesthetic. The favored presentation of neuroimaging data 
creates the appearance that the activation is a natural property of the brain, with a scale 
and smoothness that matches the anatomical structures (e.g., the cortical folds and 
subcortical nuclei). Indeed, the colored blobs of functional activity look like they could 
have grown there, revealed by the scanner in the same way a multiple sclerosis plaque 
or benign brain tumor are revealed by a structural scan (Figure 4). The appearance of 
functional neuroimaging data facilitates an interpretation of the results as representative 
of a static, innate property of the brain, as opposed to the outcome of particular 
experimental circumstances. Recent advances of multi-voxel analysis not withstanding, 
this display aesthetic has also encouraged now outdated interpretations of brain 
function and mental operations as highly localized (i.e., confined to one area of the 
brain).
Room for astonishment
In seeking to understand the influence of neuroimaging in general, and fMRI in 
particular, it must finally be acknowledged that this is an astonishing scientific tool. 
Despite the blurring effect of the hemodynamic response, fMRI is routinely used to 
measure the activity of as few as 23,000 neurons integrated over 3 seconds of time.  1
This is a monumental accomplishment. Functional MRI provides a series of volumetric 
images of the entire human brain, from motor cortex to cerebellum, each image 
 For details of this calculation, see: https://cfn.upenn.edu/aguirre/wiki/1
public:neurons_in_a_voxel
Figure 4
composed of tiny resolution elements smaller than the tip of your pinkie, assembled into 
a movie of brain activity that updates every three seconds. All this is done non-
invasively, without radiation, while the subject lies comfortably in a scanner.
Despite the limitations imposed by physiology and scientific fallibility, the aggregate of 
insights produced by neuroimaging is impressive, and growing rapidly. MVPA and 
resting-state approaches are powerful new analytic tools, which are ushering in a 
second age of neuroimaging research, with increased rigor, improved applicability to 
clinical populations, and a focus upon empirical prediction. Like any other scientific 
enterprise, there are fits and starts, with keen-eyed critics playing their part to sharpen 
the approach.
Figure Legends
Figure 1. BOLD “echoplanar” functional data. (a) Shown is a 2-dimensional, axial 
(horizontal) slice through a volume of brain activity data. The front of the head is 
towards the top of the image. The super-imposed grid is a cartoon representation of the 
voxels from which such an image is composed, although in reality the voxels are about 
3 times smaller. (b) The time series data for one voxel (indicated in black) for a 
hypothetical experiment. Consider a study in which a subject viewed pictures of faces. 
Every 30 seconds these pictures changed from having a fearful expression to a neutral 
expression. For the selected voxel, there might ensue a fMRI response that rose and 
fell in synchrony with the change in facial expression. Each point on the plot represents 
the fMRI signal value from the example voxel during the 3 seconds it took to acquire 
one brain volume. The signal convincingly follows the experimental paradigm in this 
cartoon example, with the expected delay and smoothing of the response in time 
induced by the sluggish change in blood flow that is being measured.
Figure 2. Calculation of a statistical map. In this example, a statistical test is used to 
compare the mean signal during the two experimental conditions (in reality, more 
nuanced models of evoked response are used). This test yields a statistical value which 
is displayed as a color code for the voxel from which the time-series was obtained. This 
process is repeated for every voxel in the brain volume.
Figure 3. Display of a statistical map. Starting from the initial, volumetric statistical map, 
several manipulations of the data are undertaken to report the result. These include: (i) 
thresholding the map to only include those voxels with results that were unlikely to have 
arisen by chance; (ii) smoothing the data in space; (iii) displaying the areas of response 
on an anatomical image; and (iv) creating a digital reconstruction of the cortical surface.
Figure 4. “Organic” activation. A typical neuroimaging result is shown between (left) a 
FLAIR image of a white matter lesion and (right) a gadolinium enhanced meningioma on 
a T1-weighted sequence.
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